What the West calls China’s overcapacity, the climate calls a solution: too much clean energy, too cheap, too fast.
The Thesis — Azhar Azam, Eurasia Review
THE ARGUMENT
In Eurasia Review, geopolitical analyst Azhar Azam argues that the clean-energy “overcapacity” Washington and Brussels treat as an industrial threat is in fact accelerating global decarbonization — driving down technology costs and opening access across the developing world. The numbers behind him, from Ember’s new China Energy Transition Review: nearly 1,700 gigawatts of wind and solar added in a decade; roughly 60 percent of the world’s new battery storage installed in China last year; electric trucks at about 26 percent of new sales; and — the milestone — clean power grew fast enough in 2025 to meet all of China’s demand growth, pushing thermal generation down 0.7 percent, with coal generation broadly flat since early 2024. His conclusion: harness the benefits of Beijing’s scale without deepening strategic dependencies — but harness them.
THE ANSWER
The sympathetic skeptic’s case runs through Bloomberg Opinion’s energy columns: in “China’s Energy Future Still Runs on Old Technology”, the celebrated “electrostate” is falling behind its own solarpunk dream — beneath the record solar farms, the system that actually powers China remains built on the old foundation. A companion column’s title states the charge plainly: “Xi’s Timidity Is Coal’s Last and Best Hope”. On this view, China still burns roughly half the world’s coal and keeps approving new plants; flat is not falling, and a transition that protects its incumbent isn’t finished — it’s hedged. The electrostate is real, the skeptics grant. So is the smokestack behind it.
THE INTELLITAKE
Both sides read the same grid and agree on the astonishing part: no nation has ever built clean energy at this speed, and in 2025 the buildout finally outran demand itself. The dispute is over which fact is the trend and which is the residue — whether flat coal is the plateau before the fall, or the floor the system still stands on. Notice, too, the strange geometry of the argument: the West’s trade-policy complaint and the climate’s deepest need turn out to be the same fact — a country manufacturing more cheap clean energy than the world ordered. Whether China is “winning” energy may matter less than the question Azam forces: if someone must flood the world with solar panels, batteries, and electric trucks, does it matter to the atmosphere whose flag is on the crate?
If the fastest road to a livable climate runs through Beijing’s factories, should the West take it — dependencies and all?
— THE EDITORS, INTELLICURIOUS —
